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Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the con-
duct of monetary policy. We propose a model of monopolistic competition with
imperfect common knowledge on the shocks affecting the economy where the
central bank has no inflationary bias. In this context, monetary policy entails
a dual role. The instrument of the central bank is both an action that stabi-
lizes the economy and a public signal that partially reveals to firms the central
bank’s assessment about the state of the economy. Yet, firms are unable to
perfectly disentangle the central bank’s signals responsible for the instrument
and the central bank optimally balances the action and information purposes of
its instrument. We derive the optimal monetary policy and the optimal central
bank’s disclosure. We define transparency as an announcement by the central
bank that allows firms to identify the rationale behind the instrument. It turns
out that transparency is welfare increasing (i) when the degree of strategic
complementarities is low, (ii) when the economy is not too affected by mark-up
shocks, (iii) when the central bank is more inclined towards price stabilization,
(iv) when firms have relatively precise private information, and (v) when the
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central bank’s information is relatively precise on demand shocks and relatively
imprecise on mark-up shocks. These results rationalize the increase in trans-
parency in the current context of relative low sensitivity of the economy to
mark-up shocks and of strong central bank’s preference for price stability.
JEL classification: E52, E58, D82.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decades, there has been a switch in central banks’ practice from
secrecy to transparency. Generally speaking, central bank transparency refers to the
absence of asymmetric information between the central bank and the private sector.
This trend in central banking has given rise to a growing literature about the pros
and cons of higher transparency. Higher transparency is usually rationalized by
the economic benefits and democratic accountability required from an independent
central bank.1
The literature mainly focuses on the impact of economic and political trans-
parency of central banks in the Barro and Gordon (1983) framework. As central
banks are presumed to systematically boost the economy above its natural level,
the literature examines to what extent transparency helps to reduce the inflation
bias and time-inconsistency problem and to increase the credibility and flexibility of
central banks.2
Yet, in the current context of central bank independence and historically – and
durable – low levels of inflation, many central banks have reached a high degree of
credibility. On the one hand, the benefit of independence from political interferences
is nowadays commonly accepted.3 On the other hand, central bankers are aware that
boosting the output above its natural level would be inflationary and consider that
the assumption of inflationary biased central banks does not capture the actual
rationale for the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, Blinder (1998), King
(1997), and Vickers (1998) argue that the Barro-Gordon argument is not applicable
to their respective central banks.4
The aim of this paper is to analyze the benefits and costs of transparency for
well-established and credible central banks. Under these circumstances, the question
of transparency deals with the provision of central bank’s information to the private
sector about its economic assessment. There is an ongoing debate about whether
a central bank should explain its decisions: many central banks discuss nowadays
1These are the two main premises of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary
and Financial Policies (paragraph 4) adopted by the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF (1999)).
2See Geraats (2002) for an overview.
3For example, as politicians gave their opinion (and disagreement) about the conduct of monetary
policy by the European Central Bank, its president at that time, Wim Duisenberg, stated that it
was a “normal phenomenon” to observe suggestions from politicians but that “it would be very
abnormal if those suggestions were to be listened to” (The Economist (1998)).
4For a discussion of this issue, see Cukierman (2002). Blinder (2000) also shows that there is a
strong consensus among central bankers about the importance and benefit of credibility.
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whether they should publish their macroeconomic forecasts or the minutes of delib-
erations of their policy board.
Recently, the literature has raised questions about the value of having central
banks provide more and better information to the public. There is a general pre-
sumption that more information enhances efficiency as economic agents make better
decisions when they are better informed. Yet, in their seminal beauty contest paper,
Morris and Shin (2002) – emphasizing the relevance of strategic complementarities
underlying most of macroeconomic aggregates – argue that, in an environment char-
acterized by imperfect common knowledge and strategic complementarities, more
accurate public information may be detrimental to welfare because public informa-
tion is attributed too large a weight relative to its face value. Their argument has
received a great deal of attention in the academic literature, the financial press5,
and central banks6. In a closely related work, Amato et al. (2002) interpret the
model by Morris and Shin (2002) as a Lucas-Phelps islands economy in which firms
try to second-guess the pricing strategies of their competitors. Challenging this re-
sult, Hellwig (2005) shows in a fully micro-founded model that more accurate public
information about monetary shocks is always welfare increasing because it reduces
price dispersion.
The present paper contributes to this debate on the welfare effects of economic
transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. While Hellwig (2005) considers
the case where money supply follows a stochastic process, we focuse on the optimal
monetary policy. Our analysis is based on a model of monopolistic competition with
imperfect common knowledge and where two shocks affect the economy, namely
demand and mark-up shocks. Both the central bank and firms are uncertain about
the true state of the economy. Our approach has two main characteristics. First, we
concentrate on the effect of economic transparency in the case where the central bank
has no inflationary bias and where the private sector perfectly knows its preferences.
Second, following Walsh (2005), we consider the instrument of the central bank not
only as an action that stabilizes the economy but also as a signal that partially
reveals to firms its own imperfect assessment about the state of the economy. The
signaling role of monetary policy has been well documented by Romer and Romer
(2000). Using US data, they show that “the Federal Reserve’s actions signal its
information” and that “commercial forecasters raise their expectations of inflation in
response to contractionary Federal Reserve actions [...]” (Romer and Romer (2000,
5See The Economist (2004).
6See for example Kohn (2005) and Issing (2005).
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p. 430)). So, monetary policy entails a dual role, as an action and as a vehicle
for information. The central bank chooses its instrument by optimally balancing its
action and information purposes.
In our set-up, an opaque central bank does not share its information about the
state of the economy with firms. When the economy is simultaneously hit by many
types of shocks, firms are unable to properly interpret the monetary instrument as
they cannot disentangle the rationale behind it. For instance, the central bank may
implement an expansionary instrument either because of a negative demand shock or
because of a negative mark-up shock. This confusion reduces the informative value
of the instrument on both fundamental shocks and on the beliefs of others about
these shocks. By contrast, a transparent central bank discloses enough information
so that it reveals to firms its assessment about fundamental shocks. A transparent
central bank thus discloses an additional announcement indicating its own signals
on the state of the economy.
This paper analyzes the welfare effect of economic transparency, that is the
extent to which the central bank should fully reveal to firms its own assessment
about fundamental shocks (namely demand and mark-up shocks). We derive the
optimal monetary policy and optimal central bank’s disclosure strategy. The welfare
analysis of transparency is driven by three intertwined effects.
First, transparency has a positive incentive effect on the optimal monetary pol-
icy. As firms are unable to properly disentangle the reasons behind the instrument
under opacity, the central bank balances the action and information purposes of
its monetary instrument. This distorts its policy away from what would be opti-
mal with respect to the action purpose only. By contrast, under transparency, the
central bank chooses its instrument that is optimal from the perspective of its sole
action purpose.
Second, transparency has a positive uncertainty effect with respect to demand
shocks. Reducing the fundamental and strategic uncertainties about demand shocks
is welfare increasing. This arises because demand shocks can be neutralized by
the policy implemented by the central bank. Even if central bank’s information
about demand shocks is noisy, transparency is welfare increasing since it reveals the
influence of monetary policy on the economy and this is part of the fundamental
firms have to respond to.
Third, transparency has a negative uncertainty effect with respect to mark-
up shocks. Mark-up shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank as they
create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization. Reducing the
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fundamental and strategic uncertainty about mark-up shocks owing to transparency
is consequently detrimental to welfare since it exacerbates the response of each firm
to mark-up shocks and increases the resulting loss.
Overall, we show that transparency is welfare increasing (i) when the degree
of strategic complementarities is low, (ii) when the economy is not too affected
by mark-up shocks (relative to other shocks), (iii) when the central bank is more
inclined towards price level rather than output gap stabilization, (iv) when firms have
relatively precise private information, and (v) when the central bank has information
that is relatively precise on demand shocks and relatively imprecise on mark-up
shocks. Hence, our framework gives a rationale for the development of the economy
over the last decades. Increasing transparency7 seems appropriate in the current
context of declining occurrence and amplitude of mark-up shocks8 and increasing
inclination of central banks towards price stabilization.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines a monopo-
listic competition economy, in which firms’ pricing decisions represent strategic com-
plements. Section 3 considers a benchmark case under perfect common knowledge
that recalls standard findings in monetary policy analysis and gives useful insights
for the intuition behind our main results. Section 4 turns to the case of imperfect
common knowledge and examines the optimal monetary policy and transparency.
This section considers how announcements affect the optimal policy responses to de-
mand and mark-up shocks and whether transparency is welfare increasing. Finally
section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
The model is derived from an economy with flexible prices, populated by a
representative household, a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms, and a
central bank. Two types of stochastic shocks hit the economy, demand and mark-up
shocks. Nominal aggregate demand is determined by both the demand shock and
the monetary instrument set by the central bank. The baseline framework is close
to Adam (2006).
7The increase in transparency in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years is studied by
Eijffinger and Geraats (2006).
8See Andersen and Wascher (2001) and Blanchard and Simon (2001).
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2.1 Representative household
The representative household chooses its aggregate composite good C and labor
supply H in order to maximize its utility subject to its budget constraint,
gU(C)− V (H)
s.t. WH + Π = PC.
The parameter g is a stochastic demand shock with E(g) = 1, that induces variations
in the efficient level of output. The utility function has the following usual properties:
U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, limC→∞ U
′(C) = 0, V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0, and V ′(0) < U ′(0). C is the
composite good defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
C =
[ ∫ 1
0
(Ci)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
where θ > 1 is the parameter of price elasticity of demand and where Ci is the
good produced by firm i. θ is stochastic with E(θ) = θ¯ and induces variations in
the desired mark-up of firms. W denotes the competitive wage and Π the profits
the household gets from firms. P is the appropriate price index which solves PC =∫ 1
0 PiCidi and satisfies
P =
[ ∫ 1
0
P 1−θi di
] 1
1−θ
.
Given the overall level of consumption, the household allocates its expenditure
across goods according to
Ci =
(
Pi
P
)
−θ
C (1)
and optimizing the consumption-labor decision leads to the real wage
W
P
=
V ′(H)
gU ′(C)
. (2)
2.2 Firms
Each firm i produces a single differentiated good Ci with one unit of labor Hi
according to the simple production function
Hi = Ci. (3)
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The profit maximization problem of firm i is given by
max
Pi
E[PiCi(Pi)−WHi(Pi)|Ii], (4)
where Ii is the information set of firm i. Using (1), (2), and (3), the first order
condition of (4) becomes
E
[
(1− θ)
(
Pi
P
)
−θ
+ θ
(
Pi
P
)
−θ−1 V ′(C)
gU ′(C)
|Ii
]
= 0. (5)
Linearizing (5) around the steady state delivers
pi = Ei[p + ξc + u], (6)
where small letters indicate percentage deviation from the steady state and where
ξ = −
U ′′(C¯)C¯
U ′(C¯)
+
V ′′(C¯)C¯
V ′(C¯)
u =
1
1− θ¯
θ − θ¯
θ¯
.
C¯ and θ¯ are the real output and the price elasticity of demand at their steady state
level, respectively.
The pricing rule (6) states that firms set their price as a function of their expec-
tations of the overall price level p, the real output gap c, and the mark-up shock u.
This captures the strategic nature of price setting as the price level is the average
price set by all firms. So, each firm sets its price according its expectation about
the price of others.
The parameter ξ determines to what extent the optimal price responds to the
output gap. Firms’ prices strongly respond to the output gap when it has a strong
impact on the competitive real wage. This occurs when ξ is large, i.e. when the
household’s utility and disutility functions are very concave and convex, respectively.
Then the real wage required for additional production is high (since the household
derives a low utility from additional consumption while it suffers a high disutility
from additional work) and firms strongly adjust their price to the output gap. We
qualify as “weakly extensive” an economy with a high value of ξ and as “highly
extensive” an economy with a low value of ξ.
In this context, ξ captures the effectiveness of monetary policy for influencing the
price level. As we assume below, the central bank partially determines the nominal
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aggregate demand through its monetary instrument. In the case where the economy
is highly extensive, output gap deviations have a small impact on the competitive
real wage and thus on the price level. The monetary instrument is consequently
weakly effective for influencing the price level.
ξ also determines whether prices are strategic complements or substitutes. Using
the fact that the nominal aggregate demand (deviation) y can be expressed as y =
c + p, we rewrite the pricing rule (6) as
pi = Ei[(1− ξ)p + ξy + u].
In the whole paper, we realistically assume that prices are strategic complements,
i.e. 0 < ξ ≤ 1.
2.3 Central bank
The central bank minimizes both the variability of the output gap c and that of
the price level p owing to its monetary instrument I:
min
I
Ecb[λc
2 + p2], (7)
where c = y − p is the output gap and λ the weight assigned to the output gap
variability. The monetary instrument I partially determines nominal aggregate de-
mand. The nominal aggregate demand y is the sum of the central bank’s instrument
and of the demand shock g, i.e. y = I + g. So, the pricing rule becomes
pi = Ei[(1− ξ)p + ξg + u + ξI]. (8)
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the two shocks affecting the economy
are normally and independently distributed:
g ∼ N(0, σ2g)
u ∼ N(0, σ2u).
3 Perfect common knowledge
Standard monetary policy analysis assumes that information is common knowl-
edge among firms. While this paper deals with monetary policy under imperfect
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common knowledge, the current section derives, as a benchmark, the optimal mon-
etary policy under perfect common knowledge.
When information is perfect and common to all firms, every firm sets the same
price. The pricing rule (8) then simplifies to
pi = p = I + g +
1
ξ
u.
Note that the impact of mark-up shocks u on the price level increases with the
degree of strategic complementarities 1− ξ. This arises because the weight assigned
to mark-up shocks increases with the extensivity of the economy. As discussed
above, when the economy is highly extensive (ξ small), firms assign a smaller weight
to nominal aggregate demand and a relatively larger one to mark-up shocks.
When the central bank has perfect information as well, its instrument simplifies
to
I = ν1g + ν2u.
The resulting loss under perfect information is
L = λ
(
−
1
ξ
u
)2
+
[
(1 + ν1)g + (
1
ξ
+ ν2)u
]2
,
and minimizing the unconditional expected loss yields the following optimal mone-
tary policy:
ν1 = −1
ν2 = −
1
ξ
.
The corresponding unconditional expected loss is a function of the variance of mark-
up shocks and yields
E(L) =
λ
ξ2
σ2u.
This result is consistent with standard optimal monetary policy analysis.9 The
coefficient ν1 indicates that the central bank perfectly offsets demand shocks. Since
the monetary instrument is part of the nominal aggregate demand, the central bank
is able to offset demand shocks. By closing the output gap, the central bank also
9See Clarida et al. (1999) for an overview on standard New Keynesian monetary policy.
9
gets rid of price deviations. So demand shocks are perfectly neutralized.
By contrast, mark-up shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank as they
create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization. Indeed, in the
absence of any monetary policy action, a positive mark-up shock raises the price
level and generates a negative output gap. While price level stabilization calls for a
contractionary policy, output gap stabilization requires an expansionary one. Under
perfect common knowledge, the optimal monetary policy coefficient ν2 states that
the central bank lowers its instrument by −1
ξ
when the mark-up shock increases
by one unit (i.e. contractionary policy). As the price level increases because of a
positive mark-up shock, the central bank contracts the nominal aggregate demand
so that the price level is completely stabilized (i.e. p = 0). The resulting output gap
is c = −1
ξ
u. The strength of the central bank’s response increases with the degree
of strategic complementarities. Contracting aggregate demand whenever mark-up
shocks are positive is a standard result in monetary policy and is known as the lean
against the wind principle.10
4 Imperfect common knowledge
We now turn to the more realistic case where the state of the economy is imperfect
common knowledge among firms because they have differential information.11
In this section, we derive the optimal monetary policy as a function of the central
bank transparency and then analyze the welfare effect of transparency. As informa-
tion provided by the monetary instrument influences firms’ reaction, the optimal
policy varies according to the communication strategy adopted by the central bank.
We assume that the monetary instrument is perfectly observed by firms. This
corresponds to the current practice of most central banks.12 By setting its instru-
10As we shall see below, this standard principle does not necessarily hold under imperfect common
knowledge.
11Usually, real effects of monetary policy are adduced by some frictions like price stickiness.
Recently, Adam (2006), Hellwig (2002), and Woodford (2003) have shown that an economy lacking
common knowledge accounts for real effects of monetary policy and persitent effects of shocks
without need for additional frictions. They even show that higher-order uncertainty yields inertia
not only in the price level but also in inflation what sticky-price models fail to capture.
12Note that the transparency of the monetary instrument is often rationalized by the fact that it
renders monetary policy more effective as it exempts the private sector to “waste effort inferring the
stance of monetary policy from diffuse signals generated in the day-to-day implementation of policy.”
(See Greenspan (2001)). Blinder (1998) and Woodford (2005) also emphasize that central banks
control only a very short-term interest rate that has virtually no economic relevance. Monetary
policy however drives financial market prices only to the extent that it influences market expec-
tations about the future development of short-term interest rates. Arbitrage requires long-term
interest rates to be the cumulative combination of short-term rates expected by the market. In this
10
ment publicly, the central bank implicitly discloses a public signal to firms. However,
without additional information, firms are unable to understand the central bank’s
assessment about the economy. This is the reason why many central banks, addi-
tionnally to revealing the level of their instrument (e.g. the level of the overnight
interest rate), explain their decision. A clear trend in this respect is the switch
towards communication of the minutes of Monetary Policy Committee discussions.
This section precisely aims at evaluating such communication strategies by consid-
ering whether the central bank should disclose additional information in the form of
an explicit announcement that precisely reveals to the private sector its view about
the state of the economy.
The information structure of the central bank is as follows. The central bank
receives a signal on both the demand and the mark-up shocks in private. Each signal
– or estimate – deviates from the true fundamental value by an error term that is
normally distributed:
gcb = g + η, with η ∼ N(0, σ
2
η)
ucb = u + µ, with µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
µ),
where η and µ are independently distributed.
The central bank chooses its instrument to minimize (7). Since both fundamental
shocks and both error terms are independently normally distributed, the optimal
instrument rule of the central bank is a linear combination of its signals and can be
written as
I = ν1(g + η) + ν2(u + µ). (9)
We first present the case where the central bank does not announce the rationale
behind its instrument (opacity) and second the case where it reveals its own signals
(transparency). Then we compare and discuss the optimal disclosure policy.
4.1 No announcement (opacity)
Each firm i receives a private signal on the mark-up shock ui that may be inter-
preted as a private estimate. The private signal of each firm deviates from the true
context, a transparent instrument helps the central bank shaping market expectations. This effect
of transparency is however ignored in our set-up since we assume that the central bank directly
determines a part of the nominal aggregate demand.
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mark-up shock by an error term that is normally distributed:
ui = u + ρi, with ρi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ρ),
where ρi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
Firms also receive a public signal in the form of the monetary policy instrument
(9). By setting its instrument, the central bank gives an indication to firms of its
own beliefs about the state of the economy. Yet, without announcement, firms are
uncertain about the right interpretation of the monetary instrument and about how
others may interpret it. Firms rationally use the monetary instrument to infer the
fundamental shocks g and u, and the expectations of other firms about these shocks.
4.1.1 Equilibrium
To determine the perfect Bayesian equilibrium behavior of firms, we recall the
optimal pricing rule (8) for convenience and substitute successively the average price
level with higher order expectations about the demand and mark-up shocks and the
monetary instrument
pi = Ei[(1− ξ)p + ξg + u + ξI]
= Ei
[
ξg + u + ξI + (1− ξ)
[
E¯[ξg + u + ξI + (1− ξ)[E¯[ξg + u + ξI + . . .]]]
]]
.
We denote by Ei(.) the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its information
and by E¯(.) the average expectation operator such that E¯(.) =
∫
i
Ei(.)di. With
heterogeneous information, the law of iterated expectations fails and expectations
of higher order do not collapse to the average expectation of degree one.13 Thus, we
rewrite the pricing rule as
pi =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)kEi
[
E¯
(k)(ξg + u + ξI)
]
,
and averaging over firms yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[
E¯
(k+1)(ξg + u + ξI)
]
, (10)
13See Morris and Shin (2002).
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where k is the degree of higher order iterations. We use the notation: E¯(0)(x) =
x, E¯(1)(x) = E¯(x), and E¯(2)(x) = E¯E¯(1)(x) = E¯E¯(x). The price level p is a weighted
average of higher order expectations of the nominal aggregate demand. The corre-
sponding output gap is given by
c = y − p = g + I −
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[
E¯
(k+1)(ξg + u + ξI)
]
.
The output gap is the difference between the nominal aggregate demand and the
weighted average of higher order expectations of the demand shock g, the mark-up
shock u, and the monetary instrument I. As fundamental and strategic uncertainties
about nominal aggregate demand increase, the real effect of variations in demand
increases as well. In the particular case where it is common knowledge, nominal
aggregate demand has only a price effect.
In order to solve the inference problem of each firm
Ei(g, u) = E[g, u|ui, I],
we define the corresponding covariance matrix V4×4 and the relevant sub-matrices
V =
(
Vuu Vuo
Vou Voo
)
.
The expectation of shocks conditional on the private and public signals of firm i is
given by
E
(
g
u
ui, I
)
= Ω
(
ui
I
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)(
ui
I
)
,
where Ω = VuoV
−1
oo .
Using this, equation (10) becomes
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[ (
ξ 1
)
ΩΞk
(
u
I
)
+ ξI
]
,
where
Ξ =
(
Ω21 Ω22
0 1
)
.
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The equilibrium strategy for firm i is a linear combination of its private signal
on mark-up shocks ui and the public signal I:
pi = γ1ui + γ2I with (11)
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + Ω21
1− (1− ξ)Ω21
γ2 =
(1− ξ)γ1Ω22 + ξ(1 + Ω12) + Ω22
ξ
.
4.1.2 Optimal monetary policy
This section derives the optimal monetary policy under opacity. The central
bank sets its monetary instrument (9) to minimize the expected loss (7) subject to
the price rule (11). The unconditional expected loss is given by
E(L) = var(p) + λ · var(c).
First, the variance of the price level p can be written as
var(p) = (γ2ν1)
2σ2g + (γ2ν1)
2σ2η + (γ1 + γ2ν2)
2σ2u + (γ2ν2)
2σ2µ.
Secondly, we determine the variance of the output gap. The output gap is
c = I + g − p
= g − γ1u + (1− γ2)I.
Therefore, the variance of the output gap yields
var(c) = (1 + (1− γ2)ν1)
2σ2g + ((1− γ2)ν1)
2σ2η
+((1− γ2)ν2 − γ1)
2σ2u + ((1− γ2)ν2)
2σ2µ.
As the monetary policy is both an action and a vehicle for information, the cen-
tral bank chooses its instrument by optimally balancing its action and information
purposes.
The instrument that is optimal from the perspective of its action is given by
the optimal monetary policy in the case where both the central bank and firms
share the same information. Indeed, when firms already know (before observing the
instrument) the assessment of the central bank about the state of the economy, the
central bank has no incentive to distort its instrument in order to disguise its signals.
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When central bank’s and firms’ information is symmetric, the monetary instrument
reflects its action purpose only.
However, as soon as firms have imperfect information about the central bank’s
assessment, the central bank can reduce its loss by considering also the informative
value of its instrument. The information purpose of the monetary policy calls for
making the instrument as less informative as possible on mark-up shocks (and as
informative as possible on demand shocks).
Figure 1 shows the optimal monetary policy as a function of σ2ρ, the variance of
the error terms of firms’ private signal on mark-up shocks. The precision of firms’
information declines moving from the left to the right part of the graph. The optimal
monetary policy is computed with the following parameter values: σ2g = 1, σ
2
u = 1,
σ2η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2, and λ = 1.
Three cases can be distinguished with respect to the precision of firms’ informa-
tion. First, when firms have perfect information on the mark-up shock14 (σ2ρ = 0),
the central bank implements the policy that is optimal from the perspective of its
action and ignores the informative value of its instrument. Indeed, the central bank
has no incentive to disguise its signal on the mark-up shock by altering its policy
because firms already know the true mark-up shock. At the same time, revealing
its signal on the demand shock to firms is not welfare detrimental since demand
shocks are neutralized. The strength of demand shock neutralization depends on
the precision of central bank’s information. In the present case where the variance
of the error term is one fifth of the variance of the true demand shock, the optimal
neutralization becomes ν1 = −
σ2g
σ2g+σ
2
η
= −0.833. In a similar way, the response of the
central bank to mark-up shocks ν2 = −
1
ξ
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
µ
increases (in absolute value) with
the precision of its information. The response to mark-up shocks also depends on
the degree of strategic complementarities. As the latter increases, mark-up shocks
are given an increasing weight in the pricing decision of firms and the central bank
responds more strongly. With higher complementarities, monetary policy is less ef-
fective because nominal aggregate demand management has a small impact on prices
when the economy is “highly extensive”.
Second, when firms’ private information is extremely noisy, again the central
bank fully neutralizes demand shocks according to the precision of its information,
i.e. ν1 → −
σ2g
σ2g+σ
2
η
as σ2ρ → ∞. However, the central bank does not respond to
mark-up shocks because firms do not respond to them since they get very noisy
private signals, i.e. ν2 → 0 as σ
2
ρ →∞.
14With perfect information, the mark-up shock is common knowledge among firms.
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Third, for intermediate values of information precision, the optimal monetary
policy depends on both the precision of private information and the degree of strate-
gic complementarities. We first describe the central bank’s response to mark-up
shocks and then its response to demand shocks.
The optimal policy can be divided into two policy regions. When 0 < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
< ξ,
the central bank responds to mark-up shocks according to the so-called lean against
the wind principle by contracting the nominal aggregate demand whenever its signal
on the mark-up shock is positive (i.e. ν2 < 0). And when ξ < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
< ∞, it
implements a slightly expansionary instrument whenever its signal on the mark-up
shock is positive. The sign of the policy coefficient ν2 depends on the effectiveness of
monetary policy to stabilize the price level. Under opacity, the uncertainty of firms
about the policy response of the central bank to mark-up shocks is large and this
reduces the impact of the policy on the price level. As discussed in section 3, mark-
up shocks create a trade-off between price level and output gap stabilization. The
central bank is involved either in price level or output gap stabilization according to
the effectiveness of its policy to stabilize the price level. This effectiveness is high
when firms’ fundamental and strategic uncertainty about the central bank’s response
to mark-up shocks is low. This arises either when firms’ private information is highly
accurate (i.e. private signals are good indicators for central bank’s response) or when
strategic complementarities are weak (i.e. strategic uncertainty plays only a minor
role). Otherwise, as uncertainty surrounding the response to mark-up shocks is
high, the central bank finds it optimal to stabilize the output gap by expanding
nominal demand in response to positive mark-up shocks.15 The strength of the
policy response to mark-up shocks ν2 declines with σ
2
ρ. As the quality of firms’
information decreases, prices react also less to firms’ expected mark-up shocks and
the central bank finds it optimal to respond less strongly to them as well.
By doing so, the central bank reduces the informative value of its instrument
about mark-up shocks. As complementarities increase, the weight put on the mone-
tary instrument in the pricing rule increases because of its focal role. The informative
value of the instrument becomes more relevant and the informative purpose of the
monetary policy more effective. The incentive to reduce the response to mark-up
shocks is thus larger when the degree of strategic complementarities is high.
The response of the central bank to demand shocks also depends on whether
ξ is larger than λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
. In the region where 0 < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
< ξ, the central bank finds it
optimal to respond more aggressively to demand shocks than it would do in the
15Baeriswyl and Cornand (2006) address more carefully this issue.
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perspective of its sole action purpose. As firms have relatively precise information
about mark-up shocks, the central bank strengthens its response to demand shocks
to make its instrument less informative about mark-up shocks. When λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
= ξ, as
the central bank does not respond to mark-up shocks (ν2 = 0), the optimal response
to demand shocks coincides with the policy required by a pure action motive. And
finally, when ξ < λ
σ2ρ
σ2u
< ∞, the central bank weakens its response to demand shocks.
Compared to the policy case where the pure action purpose matters for the setting
of the instrument, this policy reduces the informative value of the instrument about
its mark-up shock signal and increases its value about its demand shock signal.
4.2 Announcement (transparency)
Although the instrument provides information on the central bank’s signals, it
does not allow firms to properly understand the reason for the chosen monetary
policy. As most central banks publish their instrument target, many of them are
even more transparent and make the minutes of their Monetary Policy Committee
deliberations available to the public. This reveals to the public the viewpoint of the
central bank about the economy and rationalizes the monetary instrument.
As in the former case without announcement (opacity), each firm receives a pri-
vate signal on the mark-up shocks ui and the monetary instrument I is publicly
available. With both demand and mark-up shocks hitting the economy, the sole ob-
servation of the monetary instrument does not allow firms to disentangle the extent
to which each shock is responsible for the instrument. For example, the central bank
may implement an expansionary instrument either because of a negative demand
shock or because of a negative mark-up shock. In the current set-up, the central
bank can remove uncertainty about the rationale for the instrument by explicitly
announcing (one of) its signals. This renders the informative purpose of the mone-
tary instrument ineffective and induces the central bank to implement its instrument
for its action purpose only. We qualify such a central bank as transparent since its
announcement eliminates any information asymmetry between itself and firms. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the central bank directly announces its signal
on the demand shock gcb.
16 In this context, firms rationally use their three signals
16One may think of different types of announcement that would reveal central bank’s signals
to firms. In practice, the publication of inflation forecast and/or target appears to be the main
form of announcement adopted by transparent central banks. Indeed, inflation is a concept firms
are familiar with and is likely to be better interpreted than other measures, like output gap for
example. Nevertheless, announcement of the inflation or output gap targets are equivalent in our
context of rational expectations.
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to infer the fundamental shocks and other firms’ expectations about them.
4.2.1 Equilibrium
This section solves the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and derives the optimal
behavior of firms and of the central bank. We proceed as in the former section to
solve the inference problem each firm faces
E[g, u, I|ui, I, gcb]
and define the corresponding covariance matrix V6×6 and the relevant sub-matrices
V =
(
Vuu Vuo
Vou Voo
)
.
The expectation of the fundamental shocks conditional on the private and public
signals of firm i is given by
E


g
u
I
ui, I, gcb

 = ΩT


ui
I
gcb

 =


Ω11 Ω12 Ω13
Ω21 Ω22 Ω23
0 1 0




ui
I
gcb

 ,
where Ω = VuoV
−1
oo .
Using this result into the price rule (10) yields
p =
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
(
ξ 1 ξ
)
ΩΞk


u
I
gcb

 , (12)
where
Ξ =


Ω21 Ω22 Ω23
0 1 0
0 0 1

 .
The price level equation (12) is a linear combination of the mark-up shock u and
of the public signals I and gcb:
p = γ1u + γ2I + γ3gcb with (13)
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + Ω21
1− (1− ξ)Ω21
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γ2 =
(1− ξ)γ1Ω22 + ξ(1 + Ω12) + Ω22
ξ
γ3 =
(1− ξ)γ1Ω23 + ξΩ13 + Ω23
ξ
.
4.2.2 Optimal monetary policy
The central bank sets its monetary instrument to minimize the expected loss
given the precision of its information. First, the variance of the price level p can be
written as
var(p) = (γ2ν1 + γ3)
2σ2g + (γ2ν1 + γ3)
2σ2η + (γ1 + γ2ν2)
2σ2u + (γ2ν2)
2σ2µ.
Secondly, we determine the variance of the output gap. The output gap is
c = I + g − p
= g − γ1u + (1− γ2)I − γ3gcb.
Therefore,
var(c) = (1 + (1− γ2)ν1 − γ3)
2σ2g + ((1− γ2)ν1 − γ3)
2σ2η
+((1− γ2)ν2 − γ1)
2σ2u + ((1− γ2)ν2)
2σ2µ.
With the additional announcement, firms are able to perfectly disentangle the
signals of the central bank. Thus the central bank cannot influence firms’ beliefs by
altering its instrument. The central bank does not face, unlike under opacity, the
problem of optimally balancing the action and information purposes of its monetary
instrument anymore. On the contrary, the central bank implements the instrument
that is optimal from the perspective of its action purpose only. The corresponding
coefficients of monetary policy satisfy:
ν1 = −
σ2g
σ2g + σ
2
η
gcb (14)
ν2 = −
1
ξ
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
µ
ucb. (15)
As stated above, equation (14) indicates that the central bank tries to fully
neutralize demand shocks according to the precision of its signal. The central bank’s
response to mark-up shocks (15) increases with the precision of its information.
19
However, the response also depends on the degree of strategic complementarities
since monetary policy is less effective for influencing the price level when the economy
is highly extensive.
4.3 Welfare effect of transparency
This section analyzes the welfare effect of transparency. The main results are
the following. First, transparency is welfare increasing with respect to demand
shocks but detrimental with respect to mark-up shocks. As demand shocks can be
neutralized by the central bank, reducing uncertainty about how the central bank
responds to them helps stabilizing the economy. By contrast, reducing uncertainty
about mark-up shocks is detrimental as it exacerbates firms’ reaction and raises
the resulting loss since the central bank cannot neutralize them. Transparency is
welfare improving either when mark-up shocks are not too relevant compared to
demand shocks or when the degree of strategic complementarities is low as firms’
pricing decision relies less on mark-up shocks. Second, transparency is particularily
beneficial when the central bank is more inclined towards price stabilization. Indeed,
transparency increases the effectiveness of monetary policy on the price level.
We first describe the three mechanisms that drive these results. Then, we com-
pare the welfare level under opacity versus transparency, and emphasize the impact
of the degree of strategic complementarities (1− ξ), of the precision of firms’ private
information σ2ρ, of the variance of mark-up shocks σ
2
u, and of the preference of the
central bank for output gap stabilization λ.
4.3.1 Effects at stake
Our results are driven by three effects. First, transparency has a positive incen-
tive effect on the optimal monetary policy. In the absence of transparency, firms
are unable to disentangle the reasons behind the monetary instrument. Monetary
policy then entails a dual role, which induces the central bank to optimally balance
the action and information purposes of its instrument. Transparency eliminates the
informative value of the instrument (or makes it redundant) and the central bank
focuses on its action purpose. The incentive effect of transparency is welfare increas-
ing as transparency allows the central bank to choose the instrument that optimally
stabilizes the economy.
Second, transparency has a positive uncertainty effect with respect to demand
shocks on the behavior of firms. Transparency reduces both fundamental and strate-
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gic uncertainties about demand shocks. Reducing this uncertainty is welfare improv-
ing since demand shocks can be neutralized by the central bank. This mainly departs
from the conclusion by Morris and Shin (2002) because our framework additionally
accounts for the action taken by the central bank.
Third, transparency has a negative uncertainty effect with respect to mark-
up shocks. As mark-up shocks create a trade-off between price and output gap
stabilization, they cannot be neutralized by the central bank. Reducing uncertainty
about mark-up shocks is thus welfare detrimental because it exacerbates the reaction
of firms to them.
4.3.2 Degree of strategic complementarities and precision of private in-
formation
Figure 2 represents the ratio of the unconditional expected loss under trans-
parency (i.e. with announcement) to the unconditional expected loss under opacity
(i.e. without announcement) E(LT /LO) as a function of strategic complementari-
ties ξ for three values of precision of firms’ information σ2ρ. Transparency is welfare
detrimental whenever the ratio is larger than one. The model is solved numerically
with the following parameter values: σ2g = 1, σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2, and λ = 1.
Transparency is welfare detrimental when the negative uncertainty effect with
respect to mark-up shocks dominates the positive incentive and uncertainty effects
with respect to demand shocks. Removing uncertainty about mark-up shocks is
highly relevant either when higher order expectations are given a large weight or
when firms have very noisy information about them.
Figure 2 shows that transparency is welfare detrimental when the degree of
strategic complementarities (1− ξ) is high. Price setting in an economy with a high
degree of strategic complementarities is characterized by two intertwined features.
First, prices are mainly determined by mark-up shocks when complementarities
are high because demand shocks have a limited impact on prices as the economy
is highly extensive. Second, firms are more sensitive to other firms’ pricing deci-
sion. This implies that, with increasing strategic complementarities, firms put an
increasing weight on higher order expectations on mark-up shocks. In this context,
the detrimental effect of transparency is driven by the negative uncertainty effect
related to mark-up shocks. Indeed, when strategic complementarities are strong,
transparency, by reducing higher order uncertainty, induces firms to strongly react
to mark-up shocks.
The precision of firms’ private information strongly influences the effects at stake.
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In the case where firms’ private information is very noisy, the detrimental uncertainty
effect of transparency dominates its positive incentive effect. When firms already
have precise private information, reducing uncertainty on fundamental shocks and
higher order expectations has a relatively small negative effect compared to the posi-
tive incentive effect. So, transparency is welfare detrimental when complementarities
are high and as long as firms’ private information is not too precise.
4.3.3 Relative importance of mark-up shocks
Figures 3 and 4 represent the ratio E(LT /LO) as a function of the variance of
mark-up shocks for three levels of strategic complementarities. Other parameter
values are σ2g = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2σ
2
u, σ
2
ρ = 0.2σ
2
u, and λ = 1.
The variance of mark-up shocks σ2u captures the importance of mark-up shocks in
the economy. When there is no mark-up shock (σ2u = 0), the question of transparency
is irrelevant to welfare whatever the degree of strategic complementarities. As the
central bank exclusively responds to demand shocks, firms perfectly interpret the
rationale behind the monetary instrument even under opacity. So, the optimal
monetary policy and the economic outcome cannot be distinguished between opacity
and transparency.
However, as soon as σ2u increases, figure 3 shows that the welfare effect of trans-
parency depends on both the degree of strategic complementarities and the impor-
tance of mark-up shocks in the economy, relative to demand shocks. As discussed in
the previous section, transparency tends to improve welfare when complementari-
ties are weak. But whatever the degree of strategic complementarities, transparency
turns out to be welfare detrimental as the relative importance of mark-up shocks
increases. Indeed, since mark-up shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank,
the detrimental uncertainty effect of transparency dominates as mark-up shocks be-
come more relevant. Figure 4 allows the variance of mark-up shocks to become very
large. Transparency is welfare detrimental even in the case of low complementarities
(ξ = 0.7) when the importance of mark-up shocks is very high relative to that of
demand shocks.
4.3.4 Central bank’s preference for output gap stabilization
Figure 5 illustrates the ratio E(LT /LO) as a function of σ
2
u for three levels of λ,
the weight the central bank assigns to output gap variability. The parameter values
used for the simulation are σ2g = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
µ = 0.2σ
2
u, σ
2
ρ = 0.2σ
2
u, and ξ = 0.5.
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It turns out that transparency is welfare improving when the central bank is
more inclined towards price stabilization. Indeed, the central bank more effectively
influences firms’ behavior and thus the price level when it is transparent. As the
central bank becomes more inclined towards price level stabilization (λ falls), the
optimal central bank’s response to mark-up shocks under opacity becomes stronger.
Indeed, as the central bank’s influence on firms’ behavior is limited under opacity,
it finds it optimal to respond more strongly to shocks to better control the price
level. In order to reduce price variability, the central bank more strongly expands
or contracts nominal aggregate demand subsequent to mark-up shocks. This makes
the monetary instrument more informative about mark-up shocks and considerably
reduces the negative uncertainty effect of transparency.
4.3.5 Precision of central bank’s signal on mark-up shocks
Figure 6 illustrates the ratio E(LT /LO) as a function of the precision of central
bank’s information on mark-up shocks σ2µ for three levels of ξ. The parameter values
used for the simulation are σ2g = 1, σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
η = 0.2, σ
2
ρ = 0.2, and λ = 1.
This figure shows that transparency is welfare improving as the precision of
central bank’s signal on mark-up shocks decreases. The intuition is straightforward.
Transparency is welfare detrimental when it exacerbates firms’ reaction to mark-
up shocks. But with poorly accurate central bank’s information about mark-up
shocks, the announcement does not contain much valuable information about them.
As more accurate information on mark-up shocks exacerbates firms’ reaction, noisy
central bank’s information reduces the pertinence of the announcement with respect
to mark-up shocks. But, as transparency does not provide much information about
mark-up shocks when σ2µ is large, it provides firms with valuable information about
demand shocks and central bank’s response to them. The announcement however
reveals to firms how the central bank perceives and responds to demand shocks, and
reduces uncertainty about them.
When the economy is exclusively hit by demand shocks, transparency allows the
central bank to better stabilize the economy since firms know the policy implemented
by the central bank. With both demand and mark-up shocks hitting the economy
and imprecise central bank’s information about mark-up shocks, transparency also
improves the neutralization of demand shocks without worsening the loss due to
mark-up shocks.
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4.3.6 Discussion
Our framework potentially rationalizes the recent trend towards transparency in
the conduct of monetary policy with respect to a couple of stylized facts. First, the
occurrence and amplitude of mark-up shocks have declined over the last decades.17
Our model suggests that economic transparency turns out to be more beneficial
as the economy becomes less sensitive to mark-up shocks. Second, central banks
are more inclined towards price stability today than they were in the past. In-
deed, the recent switch from secrecy to transparency is clearly motivated by the will
of central banks to publicly reveal their intention to stabilize prices.18 In this re-
spect, our model suggests that stronger price stabilization calls for higher economic
transparency. Since the main aim of political transparency is better price stabiliza-
tion, our result highlights that economic transparency should go along with political
transparency.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the conduct
of monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge on the state of the economy.
The main characteristic of our paper is to recognize that monetary policy entails a
dual role: the instrument of the central bank is both an action that stabilizes the
economy and a signal that partially reveals to firms the central bank’s assessment
about the state of the economy. We derive both the optimal monetary policy and
the optimal central bank’s disclosure.
The notion of transparency considered in this paper is the following. The obser-
vation of the monetary instrument does not allow firms to disentangle the central
bank’s opinion about each shock. A transparent central bank removes this uncer-
tainty by disclosing an additional announcement that explains to the private sector
the rationale behind its instrument. Under opacity, firms are unable to perfectly
disentangle the central bank’s signals responsible for the instrument. So, the cen-
tral bank chooses its instrument by optimally balancing its action and information
purposes. By contrast, under transparency, the central bank allows firms to identify
the rationale behind the instrument and implements the policy that is optimal in
the perspective of its sole action purpose.
In this context, we show that transparency is welfare increasing (i) when the
17See Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Andersen and Wascher (2001).
18See Geraats (2002) and Rogoff (2003).
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degree of strategic complementarities is low, (ii) when the economy is not too af-
fected by mark-up shocks, (iii) when the central bank is more inclined towards price
stabilization, (iv) when firms have relatively precise private information, and (v)
when the central bank has information that is relatively precise on demand shocks
and relatively imprecise on mark-up shocks.
This result rationalizes the increase in central bank’s transparency in the current
context where mark-up shocks have a relatively low impact on the economic devel-
opment. Since central banks that assign a large weight on price stabilization tend to
be transparent with respect to their political targets, our framework suggests that
economic transparency should go along wiht political transparency.
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